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Abstract
We embody a notion of stability for coalition structures by Hart and Kurz (1983) into the
framework of general equilibrium, by generalizing the classical value allocation notion
(Shapley, 1969) to situations where: (a) agents organize themselves voluntarily into coalition
structures; (b) the process of coalition formation is treated as endogenous. To this end we
introduce the definition of stable coalition structure value allocation and provide, under
standard hypotheses, a preliminary existence result for the three--player case in an exchange
economy.
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1 Introduction
In a previous work (Centrone and Meo, 2008), we faced the issue of endogenous
coalition formation in the framework of games without side payments: pre-
cisely, we defined a new solution concept, the stable Coalition Structure (CS)
valuation, based on Owen’s extension (1977) of the Shapley value for games
with side payments to situations where players are organized in coalitions (the
Coalition Structure value), and on a notion of stability by Hart and Kurz
(1983) based on the strong Nash equilibria of a “game among coalitions”and
on the CS value. We provided an existence result for the three-player case,
where the restrictive setting is caused by the non-existence of stable coalition
structures in the general case.
The aim and main contribution of this note is to introduce the previous ele-
ments into the framework of a general equilibrium model by defining a solution
concept for an exchange economy which seeks (a) to evaluate each agent’s po-
sition in the market by taking into account how his own bargaining opportu-
nities and gains attainable through cooperation vary within different coalition
structures and (b) to select a collectively stable outcome. To this end we pro-
pose the notion of stable CS value allocation, which parallels and extends the
classical notion of value allocation (Shapley, 1969) to account for endogenous
formation of coalitions, with the CS value substituting for the Shapley value
and the CS stable valuation for the classical Shapley one. As a byproduct of
our main Theorem 1 we get an existence result for stable CS value allocations
(Corollary 1) in an exchange economy with three players. We point out that
Krasa, Temimi and Yannelis (2003) were the first to introduce the CS value
allocations in the context of differential information economies; the extra twist
of our approach is represented by the fact that, through the stable CS value
allocation, agents are able to compare their prospects in the various coalition
structures and choose the most advantageous one.
2 Basic notions
We will adopt the following notation. Given n ∈ N, Rn denotes the n-
dimensional Euclidean space and Rn+ its nonnegative orthant. We will use
the symbol ≥ to order vectors in Rn with the standard interpretation: x ≥
y ⇐⇒ xi ≥ yi, for every i = 1, . . . , n. For a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, piS denotes
the projection defined from Rn onto R|S| which maps each x ∈ Rn onto the
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element xS with coordinates indexed by elements of S.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a non-empty finite set of players. Each subset S ⊂ N
is referred to as a coalition. We denote the collection of coalitions, i.e., the
set of all subsets of N , by P(N).
A game with side payments in characteristic form is a pair (N, ν) where
ν : P(N) −→ R is a real-valued function such that ν(∅) = 0, called the char-
acteristic function of the game.
The real number ν(S) may be interpreted as the total “utility” that members
of S can divide among themselves when they agree to a contract about coop-
eration and act as a unit.
A game without side payments is a pair (N, V ), where V is a correspon-
dence from P(N) into Rn satisfying the following properties:
1. V (S) 6= ∅, for all S ∈ P(N);
2. if x, y ∈ Rn, S ∈ P(N) and xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ S, then x ∈ V (S) implies
that y ∈ V (S) (comprehensiveness);
3. V (N) is convex;
4. V (S) is closed, for all S ∈ P(N);
5. piS(V (S))×piT (V (T )) ⊂ piS∪T (V (S∪T )) for all disjoint S and T in P(N)
(superadditivity).
For each S ∈ P(N), V (S) can be interpreted as the set of feasible payoff
vectors which players in that coalition can assure for themselves by acting
cooperatively.
A game without side payments (N, V ) is compactly generated if there exists
a compact set H ⊆ Rn such that:
V (N) = {x ∈ Rn : ∃ y ∈ H such that y ≥ x}.
The Coalition Structure (CS) value, first introduced by Owen (1977) and fur-
ther developed by Hart and Kurz (1983), generalizes the Shapley value to
situations where players can voluntarily organize themselves into coalitions.
The simplest form of organization is considered, that of a partition over the
players set: given a game (N, ν), a coalition structure is a finite partition
B = {B1, . . . , Bm} of N .
The CS value has the same properties of the Shapley value (in particular, it is
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efficient and individually rational) and is given for each player, by some aver-
aging of the player’s expected contributions to the coalitions he is a member
of. This expected contribution takes into consideration the coalition structure
B in the following way.
An order on N is consistent with B if, for every k = 1, . . . ,m and every
i, j ∈ Bk, all elements of N between i and j also belong to Bk. There are
(m!b1!b2! . . . bm!)
−1 such consistent orders (each assumed to be equally likely),
where bk = |Bk| , k = 1, . . . ,m.
In analogy with the Shapley value, the CS value of a game (N, ν) given the
coalition structure B is the unique payoff vector which assigns to player i the
quantity:
φi(ν,B) = 1
m!b1! · · · bm!
∑
piB
[ν(P (piB, i) ∪ {i})− ν(P (piB, i))] ,
where the sum is taken over all orders piB consistent with the coalition struc-
ture B and, for each piB, P (piB, i) denotes the coalition of players preceding
player i in the order piB.
Since the quantity φi(ν,B) can be interpreted as the expected utility of player
i in participating in the game ν when players are organized in coalitions ac-
cording to B, each player is then able to compare his prospects in the various
coalition structures. Based on this idea, Hart and Kurz (1983) have intro-
duced a non-cooperative game of coalition formation whose solutions identify
in a complete endogenous way the “stable” coalition structures; they present
two models of stability, each based on the strong Nash equilibria of an appro-
priate game and differing in the reaction of the other players when a coalition
breaks apart.
In Model ∆, players announce a coalition they would like to belong to; the
players which announce the same list will result in a coalition.
Model ∆: The noncooperative game ∆ is described by:
1. The set of players is N = {1, . . . , n};
2. For each i ∈ N , the set of strategies of i is Σi = {S ⊂ N : i ∈ S};
3. For each n-tuple of strategies σ = (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ Σ1 × · · · × Σn and
each i ∈ N , the payoff to i is φi(ν,B(δ)σ ), where B(δ)σ is the coalition
structure which forms according to the criterion explained above, that
is: Bδσ = {T ⊂ N : i, j ∈ T if and only if Si = Sj}.
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In Model Γ, players announce a coalition they would like to belong to. A
coalition forms if and only if all members make the same proposal.
Model Γ: The noncooperative game Γ is described by:
1. The set of players is N = {1, . . . , n};
2. For each i ∈ N , the set of strategies of i is Σi = {S ⊂ N : i ∈ S};
3. For each n-tuple of strategies σ = (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ Σ1 × · · · × Σn and
each i ∈ N , the payoff to i is φi(ν,B(γ)σ ), where B(γ)σ is the coalition
structure which forms according to the criterion explained above, that is
B(γ)σ = {T σi : i ∈ N}, where:
T σi =
{
Si, if Sj = Si for all j ∈ Si,
{i}, otherwise
Considered a coalition structure B and a player i ∈ N , let SBi be the element
of B to which i belongs and set σB = (SBi )i∈N . If the players choose σB, then
in both ∆ and Γ the resulting coalition structure is B.
Definition 1. The coalition structure B is δ − stable (γ − stable) in the
game (N, ν) if σB is a strong equilibrium of ∆ (Γ, respectively); that is, if
there exists no nonempty T ⊂ N and no σ̂i ∈ Σi for all i ∈ T , such that
φi(ν, B̂) > φi(ν,B) for all i ∈ T , where B̂ corresponds to ((σ̂i)i∈T , (σBj )j∈N\T ).
Remark 1. In general the existence of stable coalition structures is not guar-
anteed due to the fact that strong equilibria fail to exist in a broad class of
situations; nonetheless Hart and Kurz (1984) have proven that all three players
games have coalition structures that are both δ-stable and γ-stable.
3 Stable CS value allocations for pure exchange
economies
The aim of this section is to introduce an “optimal” mechanism of resource
allocation for an exchange economy, based on a cooperative solution concept.
We recall the following definition (Centrone and Meo, 2008).
Definition 2. Given a game without side payments (N, V ), a stable coali-
tion structure valuation (stable CS valuation, henceforth) is a pair (λ∗, ξ∗)
such that:
4
1. λ∗ ∈ Σ;
2. ξ∗ is feasible for the grand coalition, that is ξ∗ ∈ V (N);
3. λ∗i ξ
∗
i = φi (νλ∗ ,Bsλ∗) , ∀ i ∈ N,
where νλ∗ is the game with side payments derived from (N, V ) by allowing
transfers of utilities at the rates λ∗, i.e.:
νλ∗(S) =
 sup
{∑
i∈S λ
∗
i ξi : ξ ∈ V (S)
}
if S 6= ∅
0 if S = ∅
(1)
and Bsλ∗ and φi(νλ∗ ,Bsλ∗) are, respectively, a stable coalition structure for the
game νλ∗ and the CS value for player i corresponding to Bsλ∗.
In Centrone and Meo (2008) the following theorem has been proved:
Theorem 1. Let (N, V ) be a compactly generated game without side payments,
with n = 3. Then a stable CS valuation exists for this game.
Consider now a pure exchange economy E consisting of a set N = {1, . . . , n}
of economic agents and l commodities.
We assume that each agent is able to consume any commodity bundle in Rl+,
that is, Rl+ represents the consumption set of each agent i ∈ N . Each agent
i ∈ N is characterized by the pair (ei, ui) where ei ∈ Rl+ is his initial endowment
of physical resources and ui is the utility function representing his preferences
or tastes over the various consumption bundles in his consumption set, that
is:
ui : Rl+ −→ R.
Throughout the rest we will assume that
∑n
i=1 ei > 0.
We denote a list of n consumption vectors of Rl+ by x = (x1, . . . , xn) and call
it an allocation of the economy E.
An allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) is feasible if it is a non-wasteful redistribution
of the total endowment
∑n
i=1 ei among the n agents in the economy, that is:
n∑
i=1
xi =
n∑
i=1
ei.
For a coalition S ∈ P(N), the allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) is called S-feasible
if
∑
i∈S xi =
∑
i∈S ei.
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Given an exchange economy E, the game without side payments (N, Vu) asso-
ciated with it is defined in a very natural way as follows:
Vu : P(N) −→ Rn
Vu(S) ={ξ ∈ Rn : there exists an S-feasible allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn)
such that ξi ≤ ui(xi),∀ i ∈ S}, ∀ S ∈ P(N).
(2)
The interpretation is clear: for each coalition S, we consider the utility levels
that may arise, given each agent’s utility function, subject to the constraint
that no coalition can consume more than its total initial endowment.
Based on this strict link between general equilibrium and cooperative game
theory, we propose the following definition.
Definition 3. Given the exchange economy E, a stable CS value alloca-
tion is an allocation x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) such that:
i. x∗ is feasible;
ii. there exists λ∗ ∈ Σ such that (λ∗, ui(x∗i )) is a stable CS valuation of the
game without side payments (N, Vu) associated with the economy E and
defined by (2).
Thus, x ∗ is a stable CS value allocation if it is feasible and:
λ∗iui(x
∗
i ) = φi(νuλ∗ ,Bsλ∗), ∀ i ∈ N,
where νuλ∗ is the game with side payments associated with (N, Vu).
The interpretation is the following: the stable CS value allocation yields to
each agent in the economy a “utility level” which is equal to the sum of the
agent’s expected marginal contributions to all coalitions he is a member of,
when all the agents are organized in a stable coalition structure.
Remark 2. If the stable coalition structure we find in correspondence of the
utility weights λ∗ is the trivial one, i.e. Bsλ∗ = {1 | 2 | 3}, then it is easily seen
that the notion of stable CS value allocation coincides with the traditional
notion of value allocation (Shapley, 1969).
We are now able to prove the following existence result:
Corollary 1. Let E be an exchange economy with three agents.
If the utility functions ui are concave and continuous for each i ∈ N , then
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1. a stable CS value allocation x∗=(x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3) exists;
2. if λ∗ = (λ∗1, λ
∗
2, λ
∗
3) are weights associated with x
∗, then x∗ is constrained
Pareto-optimal, that is
∑
i∈N λ
∗
iui(x
∗
i ) = νλ(N) ;
3. x∗ is constrained individually rational, that is λiui(xi) ≥ λiui(ei) for
every i ∈ N .
Proof. The assumptions of continuity and concavity of the utility functions
guarantee that (N, Vu) is a game without side payments.
The existence of a stable CS value allocation for the exchange economy E
follows from Theorem 1 after noticing that the continuity of the ui’s assures
that the subset of R3 defined by:
H = {(u1(x1), u2(x2), u3(x3)) : x = (x1, x2, x3) is a feasible allocation for E}
is compact and therefore (N, Vu) is compactly generated.
The constrained Pareto optimality and the constrained individual rationality
of the stable CS value allocations are respectively straightforward consequences
of the efficiency and individual rationality of the CS value.
4 Conclusions and future work
This short note wants to represent a first preliminary step towards the gener-
alization of the value allocation notion (Shapley, 1969) to a context where an
endogenous process of coalition formation is introduced into a pure bargaining
situation among economic agents. Such a step is realized primarily by the
merging of our previously introduced notion of stable CS valuation (Centrone
and Meo, 2008) with the classical definition of value allocation: we introduce
a new cooperative solution concept for a pure exchange economy model, the
stable CS value allocation, for which we provide an existence result in the
three–agent setting.
Many open issues still remain to be addressed in order to try to extend our
result. The most important one concerns the existence of stable coalition
structures for games with more than three players in order to obtain existence
results for stable CS value allocations in economic models more general than
the one we have considered here. Since all the trouble with the existence result
stem from the fact that Hart and Kurz characterize stable coalition structure
by means of strong equilibria, which fails to exist in a broad class of situations,
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a possible way to obviate the problem is by using a Nash equilibrium notion
and thus reinterpreting the non-cooperative coalition formation game substi-
tuting fuzzy coalitions for the traditional ones (the existence of Nash equilibria
is indeed guaranteed in mixed strategies which call for such a substitution).
Moreover, it would be of interest to investigate if one can provide non-cooperative
foundations for stable CS value allocation in order to both explain the dynam-
ics of reaching equilibrium outcomes and select among different stable coalition
structures. This will be the subject of future work.
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